Abstract
To examine the reliability of adverse incident-reporting systems we carried out a retrospective review of the mother and baby case notes from a series of 250 deliveries in each of two London obstetric units. Notes were screened for the presence of adverse incidents defined by lists of incidents to be reported in accordance with unit protocols. We assessed the percentage of adverse incidents reported by staff to the maternity risk manager at each unit; the percentage of incidents detected by each risk manager, but not reported; and the percentage of incidents identified only by retrospective case note review. A total of 196 adverse incidents was identified from the 500 deliveries. Staff reported 23% of these and the risk managers identified a further 22%. The remaining 55% of incidents were identified only by retrospective case-note review and not known to the risk manager. Staff reported about half the serious incidents (48%), but comparatively few of the moderately serious (24%) or minor ones (15%). The risk managers identified an additional 16% of serious incidents that staff did not report. Drug errors were analysed separately; only two were known to the risk managers and a further 44 were found by case-note review. Incidentreporting systems may produce much potentially valuable information, but seriously underestimate the true level of reportable incidents. Where one risk manager covers an entire trust, rather than a single unit, reporting rates are likely to be very much lower than in the present study. Greater clarity is needed regarding the definition of reportable incidents (including drug errors). Staff should receive continuing education about the purposes and aims of clinical risk management and incident reporting and consideration should be given to designating specific members of staff with responsibility for reporting.
the data from such a system can help uncover patterns, trends and underlying problems that, if uncorrected, can affect the quality of patient care.
Much of the impetus for introducing incident reporting in the United Kingdom has come from the Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST). The CNST is a mutual pooling arrangement designed to protect Trusts from the financial consequences of clinical negligence, to promote good risk and claims management and to optimize patient care. The CNST sets mandatory standards, one of which is the implementation of adverse incident-reporting systems, and provides a financial incentive through discounted contributions to Trusts which attain these standards. Most English NHS Trusts are now members of the CNST and have at least embryonic incident-reporting systems.
Although the reporting and analysis of adverse incidents seems a worthwhile undertaking, little or nothing is known about the effectiveness of the systems in detecting cases that may lead to complaints or claims, or about their broader use in enhancing the quality and safety of care provided. Examination of trends in a database that records untoward incidents will be unreliable unless all incidents are reported. Certain types of events might be reported more often than others and so give a misleading impression of their true nature and frequency. It is crucial, therefore, to establish the reliability of incident-reporting schemes if they are to be introduced throughout the country.
To date, no studies of incident reporting have been conducted in the United Kingdom, although record reviews for adverse occurrences have been carried out successfully (Bennett & Walshe 1990; Walshe et al. 1995) . The few relevant studies conducted abroad are not encouraging. O'Neil et al. (1993) found that although physician reporting identified 89 adverse medical events compared with the 85 uncovered by retrospective record review, only 41 of these related to the same patients. Other studies have shown that about 30% of anaesthetic incidents and just 6% of adverse drug events were reported (Cullen et al. 1995; Jayasuriya & Anandaciva 1995) . A study of errors made in an intensive care unit showed that 48 were reported by the clinical staff but that 78 errors were noted by trained observers over the 24-hour period investigated (Donchin et al. 1995) .
The aims of the present study were to determine the reliability of adverse incident reporting in two teaching hospital obstetric units by establishing (i) what proportion of adverse incidents were not reported by staff and (ii) to determine whether a maternity risk manager can increase the reliability of adverse incident reporting by searching through various types of documentation.
Method
The study involved a retrospective review of the notes relating to 250 consecutive deliveries in each of two obstetric units. The numbers of deliveries at the two units are comparable (& 3000 per year) and the populations served have similar demographic characteristics.
Unit I established its risk management programme in May 1994 and Unit II in April 1995. An adverse incident-reporting system is central to both and they operate in a similar fashion. A list of adverse events and clinical indicators, many with potential medicolegal implications, has been compiled in each unit, although each list contains some that the other does not, or differs in minor details. Midwives and doctors of all grades are asked to report these events and indicators, either verbally or by written report, to the maternity risk manager. Neither unit specifies, when there is joint care, whether it is the midwife or doctor who should report an adverse incident. A sample list (from Unit I) is shown in Appendix I. It should be noted that the adverse incidents, while potentially serious, do not necessarily involve an adverse outcome for patients or sub-standard care. All staff are introduced to the system during their induction to the unit and there are periodic presentations of risk management initiatives at departmental meetings.
Procedure
A midwife with 10 years' clinical and midwifery teaching experience (M.C.M.) was recruited to screen all 250 sets of records in each unit. To enable her to identify the notes to be screened at Unit I, and to ensure that she was blind to the outcome of the deliveries, she was given a computer-generated list consisting of the names and hospital numbers of the women who had delivered the previous day. At Unit II, where no such system-generated list was available, the risk manager noted the name and hospital number of each woman who had delivered the previous day from the birth register and gave this to the midwife researcher. Planned home births were excluded from the study, as were all private patients. The 250 consecutive deliveries screened at Unit I covered the period from 11 March 1996 to 13 April 1996 (34 days) and at Unit II from 29 June 1996 to 5 August 1996 (38 days). Staff at both units knew that a study was to be conducted during the year, but were not told exactly when. A pilot study of 100 sets of notes had been reviewed previously by one of the research team (N.S.) and a risk manager to establish the feasibility of the method.
Concurrent with the screening, each risk manager recorded how she learnt about each incident, i.e. whether a doctor and/or midwife reported it to her, whether the report was verbal or written, or whether she discovered it independently. Both risk managers regularly look through a range of documentation for incidents (birth register, postnatal discharge form, laboratory reports) and also occasionally hear of incidents by chance. To assess the accuracy of the research midwife's screening, a member of the Clinical Risk Unit (N.S.), blind to the outcome of the deliveries, randomly selected and screened 40 (16%) of the same sets of notes at each unit. No discrepancies were found.
On completion of the record review, we examined (i) the percentage of the total number of incidents known to have occurred that staff reported to the risk managers; (ii) the percentage the risk managers detected themselves (from documentation/by chance) but which were not reported and (iii) the percentage of incidents detected only by the midwife researcher's screening (i.e. not known to the risk managers). As previous studies (Jayasuriya & Anandaciva 1995) have shown that staff are more likely to report serious incidents, we also classified the incidents and examined reporting rates according to the seriousness of the incident (see below).
Reporting criteria
Because a particular delivery may involve one or more associated incidents we report both the number of deliveries in each unit in which at least one adverse incident had occurred and the total number of incidents that occurred. For example, where a woman has a post-natal blood transfusion, and her baby has an unanticipated admission to the Special Care Baby Unit, two incidents would be recorded for one delivery. Any uncertainty about exactly what constituted an adverse incident was resolved by discussion (necessary/unnecessary to report) with the risk manager of that unit.
Assessment of seriousness of incidents
A consultant obstetrician neutral to both units classified each incident (except drug errors) in terms of the harm or potential harm it could cause. A`serious' incident was defined as one causing disability or capable of threatening life, such as a large postpartum haemorrhage (PPH) leading to shock. À moderately serious' incident was one which was also dangerous but less likely to cause disability, e.g. a PPH requiring a blood transfusion but with no signs of shock. A`minor' incident was one that was unlikely to cause disability, e.g. a PPH of 500 ml requiring no blood transfusion in a woman with no risk factors, although it was felt that these incidents should also be reported because they could reveal deficiencies in the quality of care.
Drug errors
In both units staff are required to report drug errors, although these were not strictly defined. Despite numerous attempts at classifying drug errors, none is universally accepted (Rippe & Hurley 1988; Hartwig et al. 1991; Walter et al. 1992) . For the present study we devised a method of categorizing drug errors noted by the midwife researcher in consultation with a senior pharmacist. This classification comprised (i) documentation errors, e.g. not recording on the drug chart that medication was given; (ii) prescribing errors, e.g. prescribing the wrong dose and (iii) administration errors, e.g. administering a drug more frequently than prescribed. These were broken down further into errors of minor, moderate or high severity. Errors were considered to be`minor' if they were thought unlikely to harm or put a person at risk, and`moderate' if they were (none was classed as `severe'). The pharmacist classified each error using this framework.
Results

Record review
At Unit I, 245 of the 250 deliveries were singleton births, four were twin births and there was one set of triplets (i.e. 256 babies). At Unit II, there were 247 singletons, one set of twins and two sets of triplets (i.e. 255 babies). Table 1 shows that the vast majority of mother and baby notes from both units were retrieved and reviewed, but that the research midwife was not able to find all components of the records relating to all 250 deliveries in each unit.
In Unit I, the figure given for`obstetric file only' excludes two sets where only temporary notes were found. Four sets of`baby's notes only' could not be found, one of which contained details of an adverse event (known to the risk manager). The midwife researcher missed one incident that the risk manager knew about.
In Unit II one woman's obstetric file, containing information about an incident reported to the risk manager, could not be found, and some of the notes from one baby's file were missing. The midwife researcher missed six incidents known to the risk manager although she could not have detected four of them because the records contained insufficient details, and in one case, a misleading entry was made. Table 2 shows the number and percentage of incidents that (i) staff reported, (ii) the risk managers found out about themselves but that were not reported, and (iii) detected by screening only. In Unit I, 73 incidents were identified from 53 deliveries, and in Unit II, 123 incidents from 86 deliveries. Although the rate of incidents occurring in this unit appears high, the list of reportable incidents is longer and includes several that are not reportable at Unit I. Overall, 196 incidents were identified from 500 deliveries, with the midwife finding all but seven from screening (see above). Staff reported 23.0% of them, and the risk managers identified a further 22.4%. The risk managers were therefore aware of 45.4% of the incidents, with 54.6% found only on screening. (Drug errors are not shown in Table 2 for reasons discussed below.) In Unit I, midwives reported most incidents (15/20, i.e. 75%). The difference was less marked in Unit II, with midwives and doctors reporting 44.0% and 56.0% of the incidents, respectively. Table 3 shows the number and percentage of the 171 incidents that were considered serious, moderately serious, or minor, and the number and percentage of these that were reported by staff or detected by the risk managers but that were not reported. The consultant was unable to classify 16 incidents as the details available were insufficient. For example, a few cases involved equipment problems such as a faulty fetal heart monitor or a malfunctioning cord pH machine, but their impact on the eventual outcome could not be established. The consultant felt nine instances were not incidents at all and therefore unnecessary to report (although the risk managers had indicated otherwise). These 25 were omitted from the analysis, so that the results in Table 3 are based on 171 classifiable incidents. Staff reported approximately half the serious incidents that occurred, but comparatively few of the moderately serious or minor ones. Overall, the risk managers knew of 64.5%, 54.1% and 36.7% of the serious, moderately serious and minor incidents, respectively (i.e. reported and detected).
Incidents reported, detected by the risk manager and identified by screening
Differences in severity between reported and unreported incidents
Reporting of drug errors
The risk manager in Unit II knew of only two drug errors (one reported, one detected herself); Unit I's risk manager knew of none. However, the midwife researcher identified an additional 44 unreported incidents involving drugs not known to the risk managers. The 46 errors are referred to separately because their frequency, and the fact that they were so rarely reported, suggests they may need to be treated as a special case. Thirty errors were considered minor; the remainder were moderate. Twenty-three of the 46 were classified as administration errors, 12 as documentation and 11 as prescribing. This is, of course, likely to be a considerable underestimate of the true rate of drug errors, as omissions are by definition not recorded in the notes.
Discussion
This study has shown that adverse incident reporting does not reveal the true number of incidents that occur, supporting the results from studies conducted abroad (O'Neil et al. 1993; Cullen et al. 1995; Jayasuriya & Anandaciva 1995) , and questioning the reliability of other incident-reporting systems in the United Kingdom. Although knowledge of the true number of adverse incidents was enhanced by the risk managers looking through various kinds of documentation, the case note review revealed that overall the risk managers were aware of less than half of the total number of incidents. Reporting rates were lower in Unit II than in Unit I, but the list of incidents to be reported was considerably longer. While unreported incidents were likely to be less serious than those reported, a minority of unreported events were serious and could have had medico-legal implications.
The number of incidents detected in this study by screening is likely, if anything, to be an underestimate of the true rate, as unrecorded actions, incidents or near misses could not be identified. We assume, cautiously, that this did not occur with any major incidents, but some less serious ones may not have been noted. This would imply that the true reporting rates are lower than those found in this study.
The study has a number of implications. First, greater clarity is needed regarding the definition of a reportable incident so that staff have no doubt over whether or not to report it. A more precisely specified, and possibly shorter, list of reportable incidents and near misses should be compiled in discussion with the unit staff. This issue is discussed further in the following paper.
Secondly, the issue of responsibility for reporting needs to be tackled. As part of their introduction to risk management/incident reporting, staff at each unit are told that reporting is everyone's responsibility. Our results show that, in Unit I at least, most reports are made by midwives. This may partly reflect the previous culture in which nurses/midwives sometimes reported incidents to a senior midwife, for example, inconsistently and not to one designated person. Doctors, in contrast, might have reported an incident to their consultant, or perhaps at a morbidity/mortality meeting, or feel that`the midwives will report anyway'. Either this attitude must change so that all staff understand it is their responsibility to report, or an alternative system must be introduced. For instance, reliability might be enhanced if the senior midwife on each shift had primary responsibility for identifying and reporting specific designated incidents, even if other staff also reported incidents that concerned them.
The issue of drug errors is problematic. Occasions on which the wrong drug was administered or given twice in error, for example, are more likely to be noticed and therefore reported by the staff member(s) involved. In contrast, many of the errors detected by screening may not have been reported because staff did not recognize them as errors or did not consider them worth reporting. A similar point has been noted by other authors (Day et al. 1994) . Reportable drug errors need to be defined clearly and staff should be encouraged to report them, however trivial they may seem. This will enable the early identification of trends which can help minimize risk and the occurrence of future errors.
The two units we studied are unusual in that, at the time of this study, each had a trusted risk manager dedicated to obstetrics/neonatology. Even under these optimum conditions, only between 20% and 30% of incidents were reported. Most risk managers are responsible for several specialities and so inevitably will not be well known to all staff and cannot make daily checks on what is happening in each unit. Following completion of this study, the risk manager at Unit I was made responsible for clinical risk management throughout the hospital. As a consequence, she was no longer able to visit the maternity unit regularly or search through documentation for unreported incidents. In the first month after her new appointment there were 262 deliveries. The results of our study suggest that & 77 incidents would have been identified from the notes, of which about 21 would have been reported by staff and 24 identified by a risk manager specifically attached to the obstetrics unit. However, once the risk manager had broader responsibilities and was not able to visit the unit regularly, staff reported only 15 incidents during this period and 11 additional incidents were identified by the risk manager, suggesting a probable overall detection rate of about 34%. This suggests that reporting rates are strongly influenced by the presence of a dedicated obstetric risk manager, and that reporting drops when the risk manager has broader responsibilities.
